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TAx CONSEQUENCES WHEN A NEW EMPLOYER BEARS THE COST OF THE
EMPLOYEE'S TERMINATING A PRIOR EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

by
Douglas A. Kahn*
Jeffrey H. Kahn**
I. INTRODUCTION

The next few months will be busy ones for moving companies that have
NCAA basketball coaches as customers. In the past few months, several men's
college basketball coaches have accepted jobs at different schools.1 Several of
those coaches, who were still under contract at their former institution, had buy
out provisions that allowed them to terminate their relationship for a set price.2
John Beilein is a prominent example of this since his buy out price was so high.
Last season, Beilein was the head basketball coach at West Virginia
University where he was under contract with the school until 2012. On April
3 of this year, the University of Michigan hired Beilein to become the head
coach of its men's basketball team. Under his contract with West Virginia
University, if Beilein left that position before the contract term expired, he was
required to pay a specified amount to the university. Initially, it was reported
3
that the amount to be paid was in the vicinity of $2,000,000 to $2,500,000.
Subsequently, it was reported that West Virginia and Beilein agreed that

* Paul

G. Kauper Professor, University of Michigan Law School.

** Professor, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law. The
authors wish to thank Professor Gregg Polsky for his helpful comments on the piece.
1.For example, Steve Alford is leaving the University of Iowa to coach New
Mexico State, John Pelphrey is leaving South Alabama to coach Arkansas, Billy
Gillispie is leaving Texas A&M to coach Kentucky, Bob Huggins is leaving Kansas
State to coach West Virginia, Tubby smith is leaving Kentucky to coach Minnesota,
John Beilein is leaving West Virginia to coach at Michigan, and Todd Lickliter is
leaving Butler to coach at the University of Iowa.
2. Both Huggins (under contract at Kansas State) and Beilein (under contract
at West Virginia University) were required to pay the university in order to terminate
the contract.
3. Under the employment contract with West Virginia University, Beilein was
required to pay $500,000 per year for the number of years remaining on the contract.
Beilein had five years remaining and thus most news stories reported the payout amount
as $2,500,000, but considering the time-value of money, an up-front payment should be
less.
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Beilein would pay the university $1,500,000 over a five-year period in full
settlement of his obligation.4
Prior to Beilein's hiring, there was speculation in the media that the
University of Michigan would pay West Virginia University the amount owed
under Beilein's contract.5 The question then arose as to the tax consequences
to Beilein that such a payment would engender.6
The determination of the tax consequences to an employee whose new
employer makes the buy out payment owing to the employee's prior employer
raises issues that can arise in numerous circumstances and so warrants
consideration. While we focus on Beilein's facts in this article, that is merely
for convenience; and the issue is of much wider significance. The tax treatment
of buy out obligations is merely a subset of the broader question of how to tax
a new employer's payments of personal obligations of the new employee that
are connected to the commencement of the new employment. For example, a
new employer's payment of the fee owed by the new employee to an
employment agency for locating the job raises similar issues.
There were three possible methods for the University of Michigan to
address Beilien's buy out provision: (1) the University of Michigan could pay,
or reimburse Beilein for, the required buy out; (2) while the University of
Michigan would neither pay the required buy out amount nor specifically
reimburse Beilein, the university could pay Beilein a higher salary in order to
offset or mitigate his buy out expense and (3) the University of Michigan could
neither pay the buy-out nor reimburse Beilein, and no additional compensation
would be paid to Beilein to offset his expense. According to reports, the deal
between the University of Michigan and Beilein adopts the third option.'
4. See Nathan Fenno, "Beilein, West Virginia reach deal on buyout," The Ann
Arbor News, Apr. 27, 2007, p. B5. The report does not indicate whether any interest is
payable on the installment payments nor does it indicate why West Virginia agreed to
settle for less than the contract amount. Note that the cancellation of a portion of
Beilein's debt does not cause him to recognize any income. See Jeffrey Kahn & Joshua
Fershee, Tax Magic: Did Billy Donovan Pull Income Out of a Hat?, 116 Tax Notes 389
(2007).

5. See, Michael Rosenberg, "Ball Appears in Beilein's Court," Detroit Free
Press, Mar. 29, 2007 ("Early in the process, Beilein's $2.5 million buyout looked like
a potential deal-killer. Not anymore. The buyout has been the one constant in the whole
process - Martin [Michigan's Athletic Director] knew from the beginning that he would
have to write a big check to get Beilein.")
6. See "Beilein's Buyout Price Has Variables" Ann Arbor News, Mar. 31,
2007.
7. According to University of Michigan officials, the University of Michigan
did not pay the buy out which was viewed by the University of Michigan as a personal
obligation between Beilein and West Virginia University. See "Beilein to earn more
than $1 million a year" Ann Arbor News, Apr. 4, 2007 ("No language about Beilein's
$2.5 million buyout with West Virginia is included in the contract. The athletic
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This article will examine the possible tax consequences for each of the
three options.
II. THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF EACH OF THE THREE APPROACHES THAT
ARE AVAILABLE TO THE NEW EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE

A. The Tax Consequences When the New Employer Makes the Buy Out
Payment or Reimburses the Employee
Originally, the media assumed that the University of Michigan would
either pay the buy out directly or reimburse Beilein for the payment. As noted
above, contrary to that assumption, the parties have asserted that the University
of Michigan will not bear any of that cost. Nevertheless, it is useful to
determine what would have been the likely tax consequence if the University
of Michigan had paid or reimbursed that liability. Since buy out provisions are
common in certain types of employment contracts,8 that issue is likely to arise
in the future. Of the three available options, the question of the tax treatment
of a new employer's payment or reimbursement of the buy out expense is the
most interesting and potentially the most controversial.
In determining the tax consequences when the new employer bears the
buy out liability, it makes no difference whether the employer makes the buy
out payment directly or reimburses the employee for making it since the
substance of those two circumstances are identical. The tax law will treat those
two circumstances the same; that is, even if the new employer makes the buy
out payment directly to the old employer, it will be treated as a payment by the
employee followed by a reimbursement from the new employer.9
department official said Michigan won't be responsible for the sum.") and "Contract
buyout was not an issue" Ann Arbor News, Apr. 5, 2007 ("Michigan won't be
responsible for any of Beilein's $2.5 million buyout with West Virginia.. 'It never came
up, and there's no way Michigan would have ever paid it,' [athletic director Bill] Martin
said.")
8. For example, both Beilein and Huggins have buy out provisions in the
contracts with their new schools.
9. See Regs. §§ 1.62-2(d)(1), and 1.162-17(b)(1). While Regs. § 1.62-1T(e)(5)
refers the reader to IRC § 132 and the regulations thereunder for the treatment of an
expense which is paid directly by the employer, it does not say that § 132 is the
exclusive provision that deals with that situation; and it leaves open the possibility that
the nonitemization provision of IRC § 62(a)(2)(A) can also apply. Moreover, any
inference in that temporary regulation that § 132 might be the exclusive provision that
applies to direct payments by the employer is contradicted by the final regulation, Regs.
§ 1.62-2(d)(1), that was adopted in a subsequent year. The subsections of § 132 that
apply to direct payments are § 132(a)(3), and (d), the working condition fringe
provision. But § 132(d) is not restricted to an employer's direct provision of property
or services to an employee; it also can apply to cash paid to an employee to be used to

2007]

Tax Consequences When a New Employer Bears the Cost

Beilein's buy out obligation arose out of his employment relationship
with West Virginia University. It is his personal obligation. There is
considerable authority that an employer's payment of an employee's personal
obligation constitutes gross income to the employee.'0 It is very likely,
therefore, that the Service would contend that the new employer's payment of
the buy out obligation is additional compensation to the employee and taxable
to him. Contrary to that view, the authors contend that there are several strong
and independent reasons why the employee will not bear any tax liability for
such payments, and would likely prevail on that issue if it were litigated.
1. Deductibility of the Employee's Payment of the Buy Out
Before examining the tax liability issues, a preliminary issue must be
resolved - that is, whether an unreimbursed buy out payment made by the
employee to terminate his employment relationship with the former employer
is a deductible business expense of the employee under IRC section 162. As we
shall see, the resolution of that question is crucial to the resolution of one of the
issues concerning the proper tax treatment of the payment by the new employer.
Note that if the employee's payment were fully deductible by him, then
it would not matter whether the employer's payment or reimbursement
constitutes income to the employee since any income recognized by the
employee would be washed out by the deduction allowed to him. If the
employer's payment or reimbursement is included in the employee's income,
it is reduced to zero by the full deduction that the employee would receive; and
that nets out to zero net income. If a payment or reimbursement is not income
to the employee, then the employee would not be allowed a deduction since he
would not then be treated as having made the payment. In either case, the net
result is that the employee would have no tax liability. Indeed, since many
reimbursed business expenses of an employee are nonitemized deductions for
the employee, the Service allows the employee to omit those reimbursements
from income and take no deduction for the expense rather than to bother
reporting the income and the offsetting deduction on the employee's tax

pay for property or expenses. Regs. § 1.132-5(a)(1)(v). It is therefore highly unlikely
that Regs. § 1.62-1T(e)(5) seeks to make § 132(d) exclusive since that would mean that
it would be the exclusive provision applicable to direct payments by an employer, but
would not be the exclusive provision that applies to reimbursements. Since § 132(d)
applies to both, what reason could there be for making it exclusive as to one and not as
to the other?
10. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). See Rev. Rul. 70282, 1970 -1 C.B. 16, and Rev. Rul. 66-41, 1966-1 C.B. 233.
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return." As we shall see, while an employee's unreimbursed payment is
deductible under IRC section 162, it is not fully deductible; and so further
analysis is required.
A payment made by an employee to terminate an employment contract
constitutes a business expense that is deductible under section 162. "It has long
been established that the cost of dissolution and termination of a business
constitutes 'an everyday happening in the business world,"' and so "constitutes
an ordinary and necessary ...expense" that is deductible under IRC section
162 as a business expense when "'directly connected with, or, as otherwise
stated... proximately resulted from the taxpayer's business. ""2 In the Beilein
circumstance, the employee's prior employment constituted a business and so
the cost of terminating that employment was a business expense that is
deductible under section 162. However, an unreimbursed employee business
expense is a miscellaneous itemized deduction. 3
Miscellaneous itemized deductions are deductible only to the extent
that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2% of the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income. 4 Moreover, the amount of the deduction is subject to the overall
limitation on most itemized deductions imposed by section 68.' In the case of
a large payment, such as the amount payable under Beilein's contract to West
Virginia University, those limitations are not likely to matter because
11. Regs. § 1.162-17(b)(1). To qualify for this permission to exclude both the
income and the deduction, the employee must be required to account to the employer
for the expenses, and must do so. This provision applies to expenses that are paid
directly by the employer as well as to those that are paid by an employee who is
reimbursed by the employer.
12. Steger v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 227,231 (1999) (quoting Pacific Coast Biscuit
Co. v. Comm'r, 32 B.T.A. 39, 43 (1935)).
Since, in addition to being a cost of terminating a business relationship, the fee
could also be viewed as a cost of facilitating the creation ofa new contract, the question
arises as to whether it should be treated as a nondeductible capital expenditure for the
creation of a new contract. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(e)(1)(ii) expressly provides that the
"amount paid to terminate (or facilitate the termination of) an existing agreement does
not facilitate the acquisition or creation of another agreement ...
..Thus, the payment

to terminate an existing employment agreement is deductible. See Rev. Rul. 2000-7 (the
cost of removing existing telephone poles in order to replace them with new poles is a
deductible expense). The authors wish to thank Professor Gregg Polsky for making this
point.
13. IRC §§ 62(a)(1), 67(b); Regs. § 1.62-IT(e)(3).
14. IRC § 67(a).
15. IRC § 68. The overall limitation of § 68 is being phased out by the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconcilliation Act of 2001, but is scheduled to
revive with full force beginning with the year 2011. See IRC § 68(f), (g); but see
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (2001).
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miscellaneous itemized deductions are not deductible at all for purposes of the
Alternative Minimum Tax; 6 and the presence of a large miscellaneous
itemized deduction makes it a virtual certainty that Beilein would be subject to
taxation under that system.
Consequently, if the employee's deduction cannot be excluded from
the miscellaneous itemized deduction category, the employee will derive little
or no benefit from it. If the employer's payment of the termination fee
constitutes gross income to the employee, the employee will incur a large tax
liability since little or none of his deduction for that payment will be of any use
to him. 7
Contrary to that unfavorable tax situation, it is the view of the authors
that the new employer's payment ofthe termination fee that the employee owed
will not cause any tax liability to the employee. There are two independent
reasons why that is so. While each of those reasons can be questioned, if either
one of them is held to be valid, the employee will not have any tax liability.
2. The Employee's Payment or Constructive Payment Constitutes a
Nonitemized Deduction

A nonitemized deduction is one that is taken into account in
determining adjusted gross income (AGI) and so is fully deductible under both
the regular and the alternative income tax systems. None of the limitations that
are imposed on itemized deductions is applicable to it.
In the Beilein type situation, the employee is reimbursed by the new
employer for his payment (or constructive payment) of the buy out. As noted
above, the payment qualifies as an employee business expense that is deductible
under section 162; and, unless reimbursed by the employer, the deduction will
be a miscellaneous itemized deduction. However, if reimbursed by the
employer under a reimbursement arrangement, the payment or constructive
payment of the employee will constitute a nonitemized deduction under section
62(a)(2)(A) if certain conditions are satisfied. 8 Let us consider those
conditions.
For an employee business expense to qualify for nonitemization
treatment, the statute requires that the expense be incurred in connection with
16. IRC § 56(b)(1)(A)(I).
17. To make matters worse, if the employer pays the tax that the employee
incurred from the employer's payment of the termination fee, the payment of that tax
will also be included in the employee's gross income. Old Colony Trust. Co. v. Comm'r,
279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929). Moreover, if the employer then pays the income tax due on
its payment of the employee's tax liability, that payment also will be included in the
employee's gross income, and so on. Regs. § 1.61-14(a); Safe Harbor Water Power
Corp. v. U.S., 303 F.2d 928 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
18. Regs. § 1.62-1(c)(2).
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the performance of services as an employee under a reimbursement plan with
his employer and that the expense be deductible by the employee under one of
the provisions in sections 161 to 199."9 The problem with applying that
provision to Beilein's situation is that the services for which the expense was
incurred were services to a different employer than the one who makes the
reimbursement. Can the provision apply in that circumstance?
Treasury Regulation section 1.62-2(b) indicates that the services must
be provided by the employee in his capacity as an employee of the employer
who is reimbursing the costs."0 The question is how strictly that requirement
should be construed. Before answering that question, one should consider what
rationale could explain why Congress has chosen to provide nonitemized
treatment only for reimbursed employee expenses while subjecting the
deduction ofunreimbursed employee expenses to such severe restrictions. Why
is an employee expense that is reimbursed by an employer treated so much
more favorably than an identical expense that is not reimbursed?
There seems to be only one possible reason for such dramatically
different tax treatments of identical expenditures. The employer's
reimbursement provides a third party verification that the expenditure had
legitimate business purposes.2' Presumably, Congress is concerned that an
employee might claim a business purpose for what was primarily a personal
expenditure, and so it severely restricted the deductions for such expenses
unless they were verified by an employer's having determined that they were
sufficiently beneficial to its business to warrant its bearing the cost.

2

One

might question the appropriateness of requiring third party verification only

19. IRC § 62(a)(2)(A).
20. Regs. § 1.62-2(b). That same restriction is stated in regulations involving
related statutory provisions. See generally Regs. §§ 1.132-5(a)(2)(i) (involving working
condition fringe benefits), 31.3121(a)-1(h) (involving FICA taxes), and 31.3401(a)1(b)(2) (involving withholding taxes).
21. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Role Third Parties
Play in Tax Compliance, 60 Stanford L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007).
22. The miscellaneous itemized deduction concept was added to the Code by
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 132, 100 Stat. 2085, 2113-16
(1986). In the General Explanation provided by the Staff ofthe Joint Committee (the socalled Blue Book) for that Act, the Staff said:
"Congress concluded that the prior-law treatment of employee
business expenses ...

have characteristics of voluntary personal

expenditures.... The use of a deduction floor also takes into account
that some miscellaneous expenses are sufficiently personal in nature
that they would be incurred apart from any business or investment
activities of the taxpayer."
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 78-79 (Comm. Print 1987).
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when an employee's expenses are involved, and one of the authors has
previously done so,23 but that is the path that Congress has chosen.
A reimbursement alone by an employer does not verify the business
purpose of the employee's expense. An employer could reimburse an employee
as a means of providing additional compensation to the employee. So, the
statement in the regulations that the expense must be made in the employee's
role as an employee of the reimbursing party serves to separate compensatory
payments from those reimbursements of expenses that were beneficial to the
reimbursing party.
How then should the regulatory requirement that the expense be
incurred in connection with the employee's conduct of the employer's business
be construed? A reasonable construction is that the expenditure must provide
a significant business benefit to the employer, other than the benefit of
compensating the employee. That construction was adopted by the Service in
a similar context involving the application of IRC section 132(a)(3) and (d), the
working condition fringe benefit exclusion. In Revenue Ruling 92-69,24 the
Service held that expenses incurred and paid by an employer to assist
terminated employees to locate work elsewhere were excluded from the
employee's income by IRC section 132(a)(3) as a working condition fringe
benefit. The Service quoted from the regulations under IRC section 132 that for
the exclusion to apply, the expense must be "allowable as a deduction with
respect to the employee's specific trade or business of being an employee of the
employer., 25 The Service then construed that language as follows:
This requirement is generally satisfied if, under all the facts
and circumstances, the employer derives a substantial business
benefit from the provision of the property or services that is
distinct from the benefit that it would derive from the mere
payment of additional compensation, and the employee's
hypothetical payment for the property or services would
otherwise be allowable as a deduction by the employee under
section 162 of the Code.26
Similarly, the proper construction of the language of the regulations
under IRC section 62 that the expense should be incurred in the employee's
conduct of the employer's business is that the expense should have a significant
23. See, Jeffrey Kahn, Beyond The Little Dutch Boy: An Argument for
Structural Change in Tax Deduction Classification, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 20-25, 62-63
(2005); Jeffrey Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal Principles of
Parellilism and Horizontal Equity, 57 Hastings L. J. 645, 677-679 (2006).
24.1992-2 C.B. 51
25. Id. (Citing Regs. § 1.132-5(a)(2)(i)).
26. Id. at 53.
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business benefit to the employer other than a benefit of compensating the
employee. The purpose of the requirement to distinguish compensatory
payments from reimbursements of expenses incurred on behalf of the employer
is satisfied by requiring that there be a substantial business benefit to the
employer, other than a benefit derived from compensating the employee.
In the Beilein case, what was the business benefit to the new employer?
The University of Michigan wished to employ Beilein. They could not do so
because Beiliein was contractually prevented from leaving his current
employment. However, Beilein's employer was willing, indeed contractually
obligated, to release Beilein if it received a termination fee. The University of
Michigan could obtain Beilein's services if it paid his employer a fee for
terminating the contract. It would not be a deductible expense for the University
of Michigan, but rather would be a capital expenditure. 27 However, for purposes
of verifying the business purpose of the expenditure, it does not matter whether
the expenditure was a deductible expense or a capital expenditure. In either
event, it would be of substantial benefit to the new employer. While Beilein
also would benefit from the payment in that he would be freed to take new
employment, his benefit should not affect the characterization of the payment
as one made primarily for the benefit of the University of Michigan. An
employee often benefits from payments of employee expenses that are made
primarily for the employer's benefit, and that does not cause them to be income
to the employee. For example, an employee can be reimbursed by his employer
for business travel to Paris, France, and the expense is still a nonitemized
deduction for the employee even though he may have enjoyed his time in Paris.
As previously noted, Temporary Regulations section 1.62-IT(e)(5)
could be construed to mean that there is a difference in treatment for expenses
directly paid by the employer from those paid by the employee who is then
reimbursed by the employee. Since the substance of those two circumstances
are identical, there is no rational reason why they should be treated differently.
As stated in footnote 9, supra, a more reasonable construction of that temporary
regulation is to refer the reader to IRC section 132 as an additional provision
addressing this circumstance rather than as an exclusive provision. In any event,
as noted in footnote 9, in the unlikely event that the temporary regulation were
read to mean that IRC section 132 is the exclusive provision that applies, it
would be contradicted by Regulations section 1.62-2(d)(1) which is a final
regulation and was adopted two years after the temporary regulation was
promulgated.28
The question of exclusivity turns on whether IRC section 132 was
intended by Congress to preempt the nonitemization provision or merely to
27. Of course, since the university is a tax exempt entity, it would be of no
consequence to the university whether the expense is deductible or not.
28. See also, Regs. § 1.162-17(b)(1).

2007]

Tax Consequences When a New Employer Bears the Cost

provide an additional means of relief for the employee. Section 132(a)(3), (d)
is not identical to the nonitemization provision of IRC section 62(a)(2)(A).
Section 132(d) applies only to expenses that would be deductible by the
employee under IRC sections 162 or 167. In contrast, IRC section 62(a)(2)(A)
applies to employee expenses that are deductible under IRC sections 161 to
199. Since the nonitemization provision still requires the taxpayer to report both
the income from the reimbursement and the deduction for the payment or
constructive payment (subject to an exception for exclusion in certain specified
circumstances), it is not surprising that it has a broader scope than does the
exclusionary provision of IRC section 132(d). Section 132(d) is merely a
codification of that part of the nonitemization provision that applies in
circumstances where exclusion from income is appropriate as contrasted to
circumstances where both income and an offsetting full deduction are to be
reported.
Treasury Regulations section 1.132-5(a)(2)(i) states that a working
condition fringe exclusion from income will apply only if the hypothetical
payment made by the employee would be allowable as a deduction as an
expense of the employee's conduct of the business ofbeing an employee of the
employer who provided the property or service. An employee in the Beilein
type situation could not qualify for a working condition fringe since the
employee's deduction for the buy out payment is attributable to his prior
employment. This creates another important distinction between the
nonitemization provision and the working condition fringe exclusion. As noted
above, the application of the nonitemization provision should not be restricted
to expenditures that would be deductible as having been incurred in the conduct
of the new employer's business. Instead, it should be sufficient that the
principal motive of the employer in reimbursing the amount is to obtain a
benefit for the employer and not to compensate the employee. It is appropriate
that the nonitemization provision have a broader scope than does the working
condition fringe benefit exclusion.
In sum, Beilein's deduction for the payment should be a nonitemized
deduction since it was reimbursed by a current employer for a business purpose
other than to compensate Beilein. As a nonitemized deduction, it would wash
out any income he would have recognized from the reimbursement.
3. The Employer's Payment is Excluded From the Employee's Income
Because the Employee is Merely an IncidentalBeneficiary of That Payment
If a taxpayer incurs an expense on behalf of another person, the
reimbursement to the taxpayer will not be included in the taxpayer's income
even though the taxpayer may have also benefitted from the expenditure. For
example, while the expenses of seeking employment in a business in which the
taxpayer was not previously employed are not deductible, if a taxpayer is
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reimbursed for his expenses by a prospective employer who invited the
taxpayer to travel to be interviewed, the reimbursement is not income to him
regardless of whether he is hired.29 The taxpayer clearly benefits from having
the opportunity to interview the firm. He has an opportunity to convince the
firm to offer him employment, and he has the opportunity to see whether he
would wish to work for that firm. But, the purpose of the firm in reimbursing
the taxpayer is not to compensate him. Rather, it is to provide the firm the
opportunity to see if it wishes to hire the taxpayer and to convince the taxpayer
to accept the offer, if one is made. The Service has agreed that the taxpayer is
not taxed in that circumstance regardless of whether the taxpayer is offered a
position and accepts it.
The Service, however, is likely to question whether the incidental
beneficiary exclusion applies to a taxpayer who is employed by the person who
makes the reimbursement. The leading case in support of applying that
exclusion, even when the taxpayer is employed by one of the reimbursers, is the
Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Gothcher.3 °
In Gotcher,the taxpayer was an employee of a Volkswagen dealership
in Texas. The taxpayer was offered the opportunity to purchase an interest in
his employer. To help taxpayer determine whether to invest in a Volkswagen
dealership in this country, his employer and Volkswagen of Germany and
Volkswagen of America paid the expenses of taxpayer and his wife to travel to
Germany and view Volkswagen manufacturing plants there. Upon returning
from his trip, taxpayer invested in the dealership. The court held that the
reimbursement of the taxpayer's expenses was not income to him, but the
reimbursement of his wife's expenses was taxable.
The purpose of the employer and the manufacturers in reimbursing the
taxpayer was to have him see the manufacturing plants in order to convince him
that the investment in the company would be a good choice. In holding that the
reimbursements were excluded from the taxpayer's income, the court cited
cases that held that such expenses are taxable only when made primarily for the
employee's personal pleasure. "On the other hand, when it has been shown that
the expenses were paid to effectuate a legitimate corporate end and not to
benefit the officer personally, the officer has not been taxed though he enjoyed
and benefited from the activity."'" It is noteworthy that, in Gotcher,the benefit
to the employer was to convince the taxpayer to invest in the employer's
business. The reimbursements would be capital expenditures of the employer.
Similarly, in the case of a Beilein-type reimbursement, the new employer's
purpose in making the reimbursement would be a capital expenditure to acquire
the services of the taxpayer.
29. Rev. Rul. 63-77, 1963-1 C.B. 177.
30. 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968).
31. Id. at 123.
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While, in Gotcher, the court noted that the taxpayer had no realistic
choice to turn down the offer of the trip, that does not mean that the principle
applies only when the taxpayer had no option to reject the offer. Regardless of
whether the employee's acceptance was required, the primary motive for
making the reimbursement was to accomplish the corporate purposes of the
reimbursers rather than to compensate the employee; and that is the crux of
excluding the item from income. Moreover, in Gotcher, the employee was not
required to accept the trip as a condition of his employment; at most, the court
indicated that it was an implied condition of the company's accepting him as
an investor (and even that seems dubious).
In Field Service Advice Memorandum 200137039 (June 19,2001), the
Service concluded that, in 1984, when Congress added the term "fringe
benefits" to IRC section 61 (a)(1) and adopted IRC section 132, it intended that
thereafter any fringe benefit would be taxable to the beneficiary unless
excluded by a statutory provision. The Service further concluded that since
Gotcher represents a common law exclusion from income that preceded the
1984 Act, it did not apply to benefits provided to employees after 1984. That
conclusion is questionable to the extent that it suggests that any non-wage
benefit that an employee receives from his employer is a "fringe benefit." To
the contrary, if an expenditure is not given in connection with the taxpayer's
performance of his duties as an employee, as was the case in Gotcher, the fact
that the taxpayer is employed by the reimburser should not cause the taxpayer
to be treated differently from a non-employee in the same position. Consider
the following example:
X is employed as a bookkeeper by the Bilt Rite corporation
which owns and operates a retail clothing store. In response to
the consequences of a natural disaster that occurred in F city,
which is located in another state, Bilt Rite decides to collect
food and distribute it to needy people in F who have suffered
losses. Bilt Rite seeks volunteers to help it conduct this
project. X volunteers to travel to F and to assist in the
distribution of the food. This project is not part of X's
employment, and there was no expectation that he would
participate. None of the volunteers, including X, is
compensated for their participation; but Bilt Rite will
reimburse the volunteers for their out of pocket expenses in
traveling to F and living there while the food is being
distributed. If the Service's 2001 FSA were correct, the
reimbursement of those expenses would be income to X who
might have no deduction for his expenses. The reimbursement
of the expenses incurred by the volunteers who were not
employees of Bilt Rite is excluded from their income. Surely,
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the reimbursement of X's expenses should not be income to
him merely because he is employed by Bilt Rite in a capacity
that has nothing to do with his work at F. There is no reason to
treat X differently from the other volunteers.
While the reimbursement in the Beilein situation would be related to
his employment, they would not be made for actions taken in connection with
the employment, which is the focus of the working condition fringe provision.
Rather, they would be to make Beilein available to be hired by the university.
This type of payment is outside the scope of section 132, therefore, the tax
treatment of those payments should not be deemed to have been preempted by
that section.
In Revenue Ruling 66-41,32 the taxpayer incurred a liability to pay an
employment agency a fee for locating ajob that the employee accepted. The fee
was a personal obligation of the taxpayer. The new employer agreed that if the
taxpayer performed satisfactorily in his work for a stated period of time, the
employer would reimburse the taxpayer for the fee. The Service ruled that the
payment by the employer was income to the employee. This ruling was
distinguished by the Service in its 1973 ruling on a similar event.
In Revenue Ruling 73-351,". an employer contracted with an
employment agency to pay a fee for any person it hired through the agency, and
the employee would have no liability for the fee. The Service ruled that the
payment of the fee by the employer was not income to an employee who had
been hired through the agency. Since the employee never had any personal
liability for the fee, the Service ruled that Revenue Ruling 66-41 was not
applicable and was distinguishable.
At first blush, the differences between the facts of the 1966 and the
1973 rulings might appear to be of little substance. In both cases, it might seem
that the payment was made by the employer to acquire the services of the
employee. There is, however, a significant difference between the two sets of
facts. In Revenue Ruling 66-41, the employee was required to work and
perform satisfactorily for a period of time before the employer would agree to
make the reimbursement. That clearly was a payment made for a compensatory
purpose. In contrast, the payment in the 1973 ruling was made to acquire the
services of the employee rather than to compensate him. What would be the
result then if the employer did not contract with the agency to pay the fee
before selecting the employee? What result if, instead, the fee had been payable
by the employee, but the employer agreed to pay it without any requirement that
the employee perform services for any period of time? The payment of the fee
benefits both the employer and the employee. It is of mutual benefit to both.
32. 1966-1 C.B. 233.
33. 1973-2 C.B. 323.
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The payment should not be treated as consideration paid to the employee. The
tax treatment should not rest on the formulaic difference as to which had the
obligation to make the payment. In this regard, it is instructive to consider the
tax law's treatment of mutually beneficial expenditures in circumstances that
arise in connection with corporate reorganizations.
A so-called "B" reorganization is an acquisition of stock of a target
corporation from its shareholders in exchange for voting stock of an acquiring
corporation. One ofthe requirements for obtaining nonrecognition treatment for
the exchange is that no consideration be paid to the shareholders of the target
other than voting stock of the acquiring corporation.34 The reorganization
expenses incurred by the shareholders of the target are the personal liability of
those shareholders. Those reorganization expenses can include legal and
accounting fees incurred by the shareholders provided that they are directly
related to the reorganization. Incurring those reorganization expenses benefits
both the shareholders and the acquiring corporation. Since they are of mutual
benefit, the Service has ruled that the acquiring corporation's payment of those
expenses does not constitute consideration to the target's shareholders, and
thereby does not prevent the exchange from qualifying for nonrecognition
treatment.35 Similarly, an employer's payment of an employee's fee should not
be income to the employee unless the payment is made for a compensatory
purpose.
In summary, the university's payment of the buy out for Beilein should
not cause Beilein to incur any tax liability either: (1) because the
reimbursement should elevate Beilein's payment or constructive payment into
a nonitemized deduction, or (2) because it should be excluded from his income
as a noncompensatory payment ofwhich he is merely an incidental beneficiary.
B. The Tax Consequences When the New Employer Pays Greater Wages to the
Employee to Help Him Make the Buy Out Payment
From a tax viewpoint, this option is much less attractive than having the
university pay or reimburse the buy out. In this case, there is no question, but
that the extra compensation will be income to the employee, and the deduction
the employee has for making the payment will be a miscellaneous itemized
deduction. If the university were instead to pay the buy out directly or
reimburse the employee for it, there is a reasonable prospect for its not causing
the employee to incur tax liability, albeit he might not prevail on the issue. If,

34. IRC § 368(a)(1)(B). In the case of a so-called triangular "B"
reorganization, voting stock of a parent corporation of the acquiring corporation can be
used. Id.
35. Rev. Rul. 73-54, 1973-1 C.B. 187.
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instead, payment is made in the form of additional wages, the additional income
tax liability is a certainty.
C. The Employee Makes The Buy Out PaymentAndReceives NothingFrom The
New Employer To Offset That Payment
It appears that this is the option that the parties adopted in the actual
Beilein case. There are no special tax consequences to this choice. The
employee received no income from the employer so he incurs no income tax
liability therefrom. the payment made by the employee will be a miscellaneous
itemized deduction which will be subject to the restrictions noted earlier in this
article.
III. CONCLUSION
The only option that has any significant tax issues is the one in which
the employer either pays the buy out directly or reimburses the employee. There
are two independent grounds for contending that the employee incurs no tax
liability therefrom. One contention is based on the ground that the
reimbursement by the employer (or the constructive reimbursement if the new
employer were to pay the former employer directly), converts the deduction the
employee obtains for actually or constructively making the buy out payment
into a nonitemized deduction. As a nonitemized deduction, it would wash out
the income recognized by the employee because of the new employer's
payment.
A second contention rests on the position that the payment made by the
new employer is not income to the employee because it was made for the
employer's own commercial benefit and was not intended as compensation to
the employee. The authors refer to this proposition as an incidental beneficiary
exclusion.
Both of the above contentions are vulnerable to attack. The authors
believe that a taxpayer who litigates this issue will prevail, but there are no
guarantees that that will be so. The policy considerations favor the taxpayer on
this issue, and that is the reason for the authors' optimism. Good policy does
not always prevail however.

